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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1978 Final Report of the Governor's Commission to Review California
Water Rights Law ("Final Report" and "Commission," respectively) identified the
pressing need for additional protection of instream flows in California to provide
water that is required for beneficial uses such as fishing, recreation, and fish and
wildlife preservation.' In order to address this need, the Commission recommended
that the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") adopt comprehensive
instream flow standards for streams that would balance the needs of instream
beneficial uses against the needs of consumptive uses of water.2 The Commission
further recommended that the SWRCB immediately adopt interim standards for the
streams on which it proposed to adopt comprehensive instream flow standards; these
* Partner, Downey Brand LLP, Sacramento, California. J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Boalt
Hall); M.A., Princeton University; A.B., Stanford University. The views expressed in this Article are solely
those of the author and should not be attributed to Downey Brand LLP or its clients.
1. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION To REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 101,
120 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. See id. at 113-14.
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interim standards would provide protection during the process of adopting the
comprehensive flow standards.3 Finally, the Commission suggested that the SWRCB
may need to curtail existing consumptive uses of water in order to meet the needs of
instream beneficial uses if the water demands for instream beneficial uses cannot be
met through a physical solution.4
There are three key features of the Commission's recommendations. First, the
Commission relied heavily on a centralized standard-setting process administered by
the SWRCB to protect instream beneficial uses of water while, at least by
implication, downplaying the role of water users in protecting such uses. Second, the
Commission concluded that California law does not permit the appropriation of
water for instream beneficial uses,5 thus eliminating the potential use of a strategy
used by several other western states. Third, the Commission suggested that the
protection of instream beneficial uses of water may be accomplished, in part, by
expanding the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine found in Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution and the public trust doctrine. The Commission suggested
that the types of procedures included in the California Environmental Quality Act
6("CEQA") are not adequate to provide such protection.
As one might expect, these key elements in the Final Report were, in part,
correct and, in part, incorrect. The SWRCB's centralized standard-setting process
was critical to establish the framework for the Bay-Delta Accord and subsequent
settlements on the Sacramento and San Joaquin river systems; nonetheless, the
impetus for these settlements came from water users' desires to utilize their
respective rights in an effective manner while protecting instream beneficial uses.
Similarly, the Commission was correct regarding California law's inability to
allow the direct appropriation of water for instream beneficial uses. However, it
underestimated water users' creativity in developing the Environmental Water
Account, which provides an institutional mechanism for water transfers that
benefit instream beneficial uses. The Commission's views on the reasonable and
beneficial use doctrine, the public trust doctrine, and the efficacy of CEQA for
the protection of instream beneficial uses were correct initially. Upon further
reflection, the Commission's views did not anticipate the major doctrinal
developments in those areas of law during the past quarter-century.
This Article surveys the major developments in the area of instream flow
protection in California since the issuance of the Final Report. Part II surveys the
key findings and recommendations of the Final Report, and Part I evaluates
several key concepts embedded in the Final Report. Part IlI.A considers the roles
of the SWRCB and centralized regulation in the adoption of instream flow
standards for the Bay-Delta Estuary-the single most important regulatory effort
by the SWRCB in the past quarter-century. Centralized regulation and the
3. See id. at 114-15.
4. See id. at l15-17.
5. Id. at 99.
6. See infra Part II.C.
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adoption of instream flow standards were two critical elements in turning the
corner on protecting the Bay-Delta ecosystem. However, an equally important
element was the willingness, indeed eagerness, of water users to craft physical
solutions that both met the instream flow standards adopted by the SWRCB and
allowed for the effective utilization of consumptive water rights. Part II.B
considers the Commission's conclusion that instream flow rights would not be
allowed under California law, which was (and still is) an accurate reflection of
black-letter California water rights law. The Final Report, however, was unable
to foresee one of the major initiatives that arose from the collaboration fostered
by the Bay-Delta Accord: the development of the Environmental Water Account,
which effectively allows for the appropriation of water to meet the needs of
instream beneficial uses of water. Part HI.C considers the alternative legal
doctrines that the Final Report suggested might provide protection for instream
beneficial uses. The Final Report contemplated that the reasonable and beneficial
use doctrine of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution could serve as
such a basis for the provision of instream flows. 7 As it turned out, the doctrine of
reasonable and beneficial use received an expansive reading from the judiciary
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 8 However, the manner in which the
doctrine was implemented during the years of litigation and negotiation relating
to the present settlements of disputes regarding the Bay-Delta Estuary casts doubt
on whether the doctrine alone will serve as a strong source of protection for
instream beneficial uses.9 The Final Report also suggested that an expansive
reading of the public trust doctrine could lead to improved protection for
instream beneficial uses.' ° A careful reading of National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court" and SWRCB Water Right Decision No. 1631, among other
authorities, however, leads to the conclusion that the public trust doctrine may
not provide such long-lasting protection for instream beneficial uses as the Final
Report assumed. 2 By contrast, procedural protections for instream beneficial
uses of the type that are found in CEQA were eschewed by the Commission as
not providing substantive protection.' 3 In practice, these procedural requirements
are as important as other considerations for protecting instream beneficial uses.
This Article concludes, in Part IV, with reflections on innovation in the context
of efforts to protect instream resources.
7. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 109-10.
8. See infra Part M.C. 1.
9. See infra Part M.C. 1.
10. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 110.
11. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
12. See infra Part II.C.2.
13. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, SUMMARY FINAL
REPORT 4 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT].
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II. THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
The Governor's Commission presented its recommendations in both the Final
Report and in a summary of the Final Report ("Summary Report"). The Summary
Report puts the question of instream protection in stark relief by stating that
California has given "great emphasis ... to rights to divert water from streams, but
relatively little attention has been paid to the protection of instream beneficial uses of
water such as for fisheries and recreation." 14 Such uses of water "tend to be diffuse,
and instream uses tend to be of general public benefit." 15 California law is filled with
statements about the importance of preserving California's natural heritage, but the
"impairment and loss of instream values continues to grow. This occurs because the
existing means for protecting instream values are largely fragmentary and
reactive." 16 The Summary Report rejects, quite pointedly, the general cast of existing
laws and sets the stage for its proposals by stating that existing laws "compel
consideration of instream values in the decision-making process of various public
entities, but they do not compel substantive protection itself."1 7 The Summary Report
also points out that existing laws only require that "agencies 'must consider' or 'must
take into account' the public interest in the aesthetic, recreational, and fishery uses of
the state's waters."
1 8
With this evaluation of existing California law in hand, the Commission
proceeded to develop its recommendations for reform. The Commission began this
process by first considering, and rejecting, the idea of allowing the appropriation of
water directly for instream beneficial uses. The Final Report states that although such
"instream uses are considered to be beneficial uses of water, their enjoyment cannot,
as a rule, be secured by a water right."' 9 The Commission then articulated its
fundamental insight regarding the nature of instream flow protections, an insight that
drives its recommendations: that, "[i]n principle, a well conceived system for
allocating water among instream and offstream beneficial uses would weigh the
relative value of competing uses. The various instream uses should participate
equally in the present system for allocating water supplies, but it does not appear that
they do.",20 Thus, the task for the Commission was to identify institutional
mechanisms that "would weigh the relative value of competing uses"2' equally,
unlike the then-current system where consumptive uses of water received protection
and instream beneficial uses received inadequate substantive protection.
14. Id.
15. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 99.
16. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 99.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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The Final Report considered several institutional mechanisms that would
provide substantive protection for instream beneficial uses before settling on its
final recommendations. The Commission seemed intrigued by the efforts of
CalTrout and the California Department of Fish and Game ("DFG" to
appropriate water directly for instream flows on the Mattole River, thereby using
the prior appropriation system to benefit fishery resources.22 The Final Report
recognizes, however, that there is a serious question under California water rights
law as to whether an appropriation "requires a diversion or other physical control
over the water [being appropriated], which instream appropriations lack.",
23
Similarly, the Final Report describes efforts at the legal protection of instream
beneficial uses "based on relatively undeveloped legal doctrines such as the
doctrine of reasonable beneficial use embodied in California Constitution Article
10, Section 2." 24 The Final Report also recognizes that an alternative to the
reasonable and beneficial use doctrine could be the public trust doctrine, which
"essentially places the State in the position of trustee of public rights of use in
resources including navigable waters, tidelands, and fish. These rights are
paramount to private rights. 25 Interestingly, the Final Report barely mentions the
use of CEQA to provide instream protection, even though the Commission's staff
report on instream water uses ("Staff Report") noted that the CEQA requires
"agencies, which have regulatory authority that may have significant
environmental effects on instream uses, to act affirmatively to find ways to
'protect, regenerate and enhance' the instream environment. ,26 Given the
uncertainties associated with each of these methods, however, the Commission
rejected these approaches to instream protection.
27
The Commission, quite reasonably, sought to find a method to protect
instream beneficial uses of water that met its criterion of weighing the values of
competing beneficial uses in a manner that also allowed instream beneficial uses
to participate equally. The Commission therefore chose the tried and true route of
direct "command and control" regulation. Specifically, the Commission's
Summary Report proposed that the SWRCB set "comprehensive instream flow
standards" on a stream-by-stream basis, "weighing... the importance of the
present or potential instream values of the stream against the present or potential
22. Id. at 108-09.
23. Id. at 109.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 110.
26. ANNE J. SCHNEIDER, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSTREAM WATER USES IN CALIFORNIA 109 (Staff Paper No. 6, Jan. 1978) [hereinafter
STAFF REPORT].
27. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 113. The Commission's conclusion and recommendations are not
unusual. Two commentators write: "[s]tates have traditionally chosen to maintain instream flows by reserving
water from appropriation, establishing minimum stream flows by bureaucratic fiat, conditioning new water right
permits, directing state agencies to acquire and hold instream flow rights, or using the public trust doctrine to
establish that existing diversion rights do not trump the state's responsibility to maintain instream flows."
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 96 (rev. ed. 2001).
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value, economic or otherwise, of the stream for non-instream uses. 28 In setting
instream flow standards, the SWRCB may need to set restrictions on existing
water rights, without causing substantial harm to any lawful user, and should
favor physical solutions mitigating impacts of requiring instream flows. 29 Finally,
in order to prevent further deterioration of instream beneficial uses of water, the
Commission recommended that the SWRCB, upon petition from an interested
person, allow the appropriation of water for instream purposes on an interim
basis. 30 The SWRCB would be required to adopt a permanent instream flow
standard within five years; however, upon adoption of that standard, the instream
appropriation would terminate.3'
In short, consistent with its fundamental insight into the failings of the water
right system, the Commission attempted to develop recommendations that would
ensure that instream beneficial uses were given equal consideration with
consumptive uses of water in the allocation of California's scarce water
resources. The Commission recommended further action by the SWRCB to
establish instream flow standards and, if necessary, to reallocate water from
consumptive to instream beneficial uses.
III. THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION'S REPORT IN PRACTICE:
1978 TO PRESENT
Although there is always controversy in water law, most participants and
commentators would agree that there have been two focal points for
controversies over instream flows within California during the past quarter-
century: the conflict over the appropriate water quality standards in the San
Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta Estuary (the "Bay-Delta
Estuary") and the conflict over Los Angeles' diversions of water from Mono
Lake.3 2 Part uI.A considers lessons learned from the controversy over the Bay-
Delta Estuary, which is a classic example of the dispute over instream beneficial
uses. Part llI.B considers the Final Report's rejection of the direct appropriation
of water for instream beneficial uses and describes the ways in which transfers of
existing water rights are being used in the Bay-Delta Estuary to achieve the same
(or at least similar) goals. Part III.C considers alternate legal theories that the
Final Report contemplated to provide protection for instream beneficial uses.
Most of Part II.C focuses on the dispute over Mono Lake and the ability (or
inability) for the public trust doctrine to protect instream beneficial uses.
28. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id.
32. Another focal point for controversy, of course, has been the Colorado River. However, those
controversies have often, but not always, been between California and the other Colorado River Basin states.
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A. Instream Flow Standards and Centralized Regulation: The Bay-Delta
Hearings and Protection for Instream Uses
The basic history involving the conflict over diversions and water quality in
the Bay-Delta Estuary is well-documented.33 In brief, in 1978 the SWRCB issued
Water Right Decision No. 1485, which established the water quality standards
for the Bay-Delta Estuary.34 Subsequently, in United States v. State Water
Resources Control Board,35 the appellate court found that the SWRCB erred
when it issued Decision No. 1485 because it failed to protect "beneficial uses" of
water in acting under its authority under the Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act and the federal Clean Water Act. 36 Instead, the SWRCB had
confused and confounded its water quality planning function, a quasi-legislative
activity, with its water right allocation function, which is a quasi-adjudicatory
activity.37 In order to protect the beneficial uses of water in the Delta without
confusing its two functions, the court recommended that the SWRCB adopt a
"global perspective" that would make "a reasonable estimate of all water uses" so
as to protect the quality of Delta waters not only from the effects of state and
federal projects, but also from the effects of upstream diverters or polluters.38
However, regarding instream beneficial uses, the court found that the "modified
without project" standard set forth in Decision No. 1485 was well within the
SWRCB's authority under the public trust doctrine. 39 As the court stated, "the
Board unquestionably possessed legal authority under the public trust doctrine to
exercise supervision over appropriators in order to protect fish and wildlife.' 40
After the decision in United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,
the SWRCB held several series of hearings with the ultimate goal of separating a
water quality control plan from a water right decision implementing that plan. In
late 1992, the SWRCB issued a draft Water Right Decision No. 1630, but the
SWRCB withdrew that decision before it became final.4 1
33. The literature discussing the Bay-Delta ecosystem is voluminous. For recent summaries of the major
issues and history of the conflict, see Alf W. Brandt, An Environmental Water Account: The California
Experience, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 426,428-31 (2001); Joshua Harris, A Lasting Proposal for Endangered
Bay-Delta Fish Survival: The Environmental Water Account and the Accumulation of Water Contract Rights in
the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, 26 ENVIRONS ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 121, 123-32
(2002); David Nawi & Steven P. Saxton, Federal-State Collaboration in the CALFED Bay-Delta Program,
ABA WATER LAW CONF. 2004; Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability,
67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 342-47 (1996); Patrick Wright, Fixing the Delta: The CALFED Bay-Delta Program
and Water Policy Under the Davis Administration, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 331, 333-38 (2001).
34. S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1495, at 4 (Apr. 19, 1979).
35. 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
36. Id. at 178.
37. Id. at 180-81.
38. Id. at 180.
39. Id. at 200-01.
40. Id. at 201.
41. Nawi & Saxton, supra note 33, at 374 (noting that the SWRCB withdrew the decision out of
frustration, which led to the withdrawal of environmental stakeholders).
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Ultimately, it took the threat of federal regulation to create progress. In early
1994, acting under the authority of the federal Clean Water Act, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency proposed water quality standards for the Bay-
42Delta Estuary. Those standards were scheduled to take effect on December 15,
1994, but just hours before the deadline the major parties reached an agreement
that has become known as the Bay-Delta Accord.4 3 The Accord, in turn, served
as the key document allowing the SWRCB to issue a revised water quality
control plan in June 1995. 44
In adopting the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan, the SWRCB satisfied one
of the major criticisms of the court of appeal in United States v. State Water
Resources Control Board: the SWRCB had exercised its quasi-legislative water
quality planning function and adopted standards for the Bay-Delta Estuary
independent of water right considerations. The SWRCB then turned its efforts to
the second, and more difficult, portion of the decision in United States v. State
Water Resources Control Board: allocating the obligation to curtail diversions or
take other actions in order to achieve the water quality standards promulgated in
the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan.
The SWRCB has a long-standing policy of encouraging parties to a water
right hearing to resolve their disputes by means of settlement. After adopting the
1995 Water Quality Control Plan, the SWRCB reiterated this policy, urging the
major parties to develop a physical solution that would meet the standards of the
1995 Water Quality Control Plan while minimizing any need for reductions in
diversions.45 Diverters from the San Joaquin River and its tributaries and
representatives of the state and federal export projects were able to develop a
physical solution relatively quickly; termed the San Joaquin River Agreement, a
settlement was approved by the SWRCB in early 2000 with Water Right
Decision No. 1641 .46 Diverters from the Sacramento River and its tributaries
were also able to develop a physical solution with representatives of the state and
federal export projects; termed the Sacramento Valley Water Management
Agreement, that settlement was approved by the SWRCB in 2002.47 In 2003 the
SWRCB cancelled water right hearings to allocate the burden of meeting the
42. See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin River, and
San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 59 Fed. Reg. 810, 813 (Jan. 6, 1994) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
43. Wright, supra note 33, at 337.
44. Water Quality Control Plan for the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary
adopted and amended by S.W.R.C.B. Order No. WR 95-06, at 56 (June 8, 1995).
45. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 121 (Cal. 1992) (reiterating that the law
generally favors settlement). In passing, it should be noted that this course of action is precisely what the
Commission had recommended: adopting flow standards and then attempting to implement those standards
through a physical solution. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 113-14.
46. S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1641, at 146 (Mar. 15, 2000).
47. S.W.R.C.B. Order No. WR 2002-12, at 3 (Oct. 17, 2002).
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standards promulgated in the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan (the so-called
"Phase 8" hearings).
48
Resolving the major conflicts over the Bay-Delta Estuary without a full-blown
adjudication of the Sacramento and San Joaquin River systems, which would have
taken decades at least, was a tremendous, indeed historic, accomplishment in water
resources management. In achieving that goal, it is important to note that centralized
regulation of the type advocated by the Governor's Commission was essential, but
not sufficient, to protect instream beneficial uses.
As described above, the threat that the United States Environmental
Protection Agency would adopt water quality standards for the Bay-Delta
Estuary was one of the catalysts that drove key stakeholders to work together and
forge the Bay-Delta Accord. The SWRCB's adoption of its own water quality
objectives in the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan, and the adoption of flow-
based standards in biological opinions relating to winter-run chinook salmon and
delta smelt, were similarly essential to establishing the regulatory baseline. In
these ways, centralized regulation of the type recommended by the Final Report
served the function of protecting instream beneficial uses of water.
However, the mere adoption of regulatory standards would probably not have
been sufficient to protect instream beneficial uses of water. Absent the types of
physical solutions found in both settlement agreements, the SWRCB would have
been forced to preside over an adjudication of the 8,000 plus water rights on the
Sacramento and San Joaquin River systems. Based on the experience of other
states with such comprehensive adjudications, it seems safe to say that such
litigation would have taken decades and, during that time, the protection of
instream beneficial uses would constantly be at risk of attack by one or more
parties (e.g., on grounds that the standards were not based on the best available
science). By encouraging the parties to develop voluntary physical solutions, the
SWRCB helped to preserve the instream flow standards adopted in the 1995
Water Quality Control Plan. The impetus for those physical solutions, however,
was the desire of water users to control their own destinies and to be able to use
their water rights in an effective manner. That strong desire to wrest control over
the use of water away from regulatory agencies, and to achieve some form of
certainty as to the exercise of water rights, was also essential in fashioning the
physical solutions. In this way, creativity and innovation on the part of water
users complemented the centralized standards established by the SWRCB to craft
physical solutions that met both environmental and water user needs.
Thus, the Governor's Commission was half-right in recommending the
centralized adoption of instream flow standards. The promulgation of such
standards was a necessary precondition for protecting fish and wildlife in the
Bay-Delta Estuary; without the spur of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency issuing water quality standards, there would not have been a
48. See id. at 2 (dismissing Phase 8 automatically on January 31, 2003).
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Bay-Delta Accord. Conversely, without the creativity of water users-both
upstream of the Delta and in export areas-there would have been interminable
litigation over the allocation of responsibility to meet the water quality objectives
in the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan, litigation that likely would have resulted
in less protection for instream beneficial uses.
B. Appropriating Water for Instream Uses
1. Fullerton and California Trout
The Final Report began its discussion of alternative methods for protecting
instream beneficial uses noting that:
[t]wo significant attempts to use the existing system in a non-traditional
way are the efforts by California Trout, Inc., (Cal-Trout) to appropriate
water for instream uses on Redwood Creek and by the Department of
Fish and Game to appropriate water for instream use on the Mattole
River.... The central issue is whether appropriation law requires a
diversion or other physical control over the water, which instream
appropriations lack.49
The Staff Report, expanding on this discussion, reported on the trial court
decisions in Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Board5° and California
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board.5' The fact that direct
appropriation of water for instream beneficial uses was the Final Report's initial
option for fixing a system that did not provide adequate protection to instream
beneficial uses suggests that the Commission considered the appropriation of
water directly for instream purposes as the best possible option if allowed by
California law.
Shortly after the Commission issued its Final Report, two appellate courts
addressed the question of whether water could be directly appropriated for the
protection of instream beneficial uses. In Fullerton v. State Water Resources
Control Board52 and California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control
Board,53 both courts reached the same conclusion finding that California law
requires direct physical control of water in order to acquire an appropriative
water right. In Fullerton, the court found that an appropriation requires the
"intent to take, accompanied by some open, physical demonstration of the intent,
49. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 108-09.
50. No. 61136 (Super. Ct. Humboldt County 1977).
51. No. 233933 (Super. Ct. Sac. County 1977); STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 63-71.
52. 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Ct. App. 1979).
53. 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1979).
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and for some valuable use. 54 After surveying a number of different types of
appropriations, the court noted that "[t]he significant common element of all of
these forms of possession is some physical act with respect to the water by the
appropriator to manifest the possessory right., 55 Directly responding to the
intimation in the Final Report that courts might need to address the issue of
instream appropriations, the court concluded that:
as an intermediate appellate court, we are constrained from making a
major change in the long-standing water rights law of this state....
There is no support in the law of this state for the proposition that a
minimum flow of water may be appropriated in a natural stream for
piscatorial purposes without some physical act by the appropriator.56
Similarly, the court in California Trout began its discussion of the concept of
appropriation by noting that the "courts from the very birth of the legal concept
of appropriation of water have uniformly evidenced the basic common element
of possession. Citing the leading treatise on California water law, the court
found that there are three elements that must be met for a valid appropriation of
water: intent to apply water to reasonable and beneficial use, actual diversion of
the water from a natural channel, and use of that water for a beneficial purpose.
5 8
Because the proposed application of water for instream beneficial use "showed
on its face that no legally recognized appropriation of water was contemplated,"
the court found that the SWRCB acted properly in rejecting the application.59
2. Water Code Section 1707
Even today, Fullerton and California Trout continue to be accurate
statements of black-letter California water law. However, the continuing decline
of fisheries and the consequent need for certainty in water deliveries have led the
Legislature and water users, respectively, to create innovative ways to transfer
water for the protection of instream beneficial uses while not formally
appropriating water for that purpose.
54. Fullerton, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (emphasis omitted) (quoting McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River
and Auburn Water and Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220, 232-33 (1859)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 527.
57. Cal. Trout, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
58. Id. at 674-75 (citing WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 108 (1956)).
59. Id. at 675. The conclusion of the court in Fullerton and California Trout was further confirmed by
an opinion of the California Attorney General issued shortly after those decisions. 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 95
(1980). The Attorney General was asked to opine on regulations that the SWRCB proposed to issue that would
provide for instrearn flows and found that, because the proposed regulations would require an applicant for
water to demonstrate that instream beneficial uses of water did not require the minimum flows established by
the SWRCB, the regulations exceeded the authority of the SWRCB. Id. at 104.
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The Legislature took action to protect instream beneficial uses of water
through the transfer of water rather than the direct appropriation of water in 1991.
Water Code section 1707 provides that the holder of a right to water may petition
the SWRCB to transfer all or a portion of the water right for use to preserve or
enhance "wetlands habitat, fish and wildlife resources, or recreation in, or on, the
water." 60 The transfer petition is then subject to limitations similar to those that
apply to all other transfers, such as the no-injury rule.6' The water subject to the
transfer will normally be used to meet existing regulatory standards (such as
those adopted in the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan), but may also, at the
request of the petitioner, be deemed to be in addition to such standards and so
provide enhanced instream floWS.
62
3. The Environmental Water Account
Although there have been several water transfers under the provisions of
Water Code section 1707,63 the provisions of section 1707 have largely been
overtaken by the transfer of water to the CALFED Bay-Delta Authority's
Environmental Water Account ("EWA"). The EWA has been described as the
"centerpiece" of the CALFED program; 64 accordingly, it has been the subject of
much commentary.65
The EWA is an attempt to shatter the impasse that prevailed for many years
between the protection of instream beneficial uses and the needs of consumptive
uses of water and is probably the most innovative element in the entire CALFED
Bay-Delta Program. As described by CALFED:
The Environmental Water Account is a cooperative management program
whose purpose is to provide protection to the fish of the Bay/Delta Estuary
through environmentally beneficial changes in the operations of the federal
Central Valley Project (CVP) and the California State Water Project (SWP)
at no uncompensated water cost to the CVP and SWP project users.66
60. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
61. Id. § 1707(b).
62. Id. § 1707(c)-(d).
63. See, e.g., S.W.R.C.B. Order No. WR 94-04, at 9 (Oct. 20, 1994) (affirming approval of section 1707
water transfer by Merced Irrigation District); S.W.R.C.B. Order No. WR 98-01, at 10 (Jan. 7, 1998) (denying
petition to reconsider approval of a section 1707 transfer by Merced Irrigation District); S.W.R.C.B. Order No.
WR 2000-14, at 8 (Oct. 19, 2000) (authorizing section 1707 transfer by Merced Irrigation District); S.W.R.CB.
Order No. WR 2001-17, at 9 (Aug. 2, 2001) (approving section 1707 transfer by Browns Valley Irrigation
District); S.W.R.C.B. Order No. WR 2002-05, at 11 (June 17, 2002) (approving section 1707 transfer by Yuba
County Water Agency); S.W.R.C.B. Order No. WR 2003-01, at 7 (Jan. 22, 2003) (affirming denial of petition
for section 1707 transfer by Dagny Grant because of alleged forfeiture for non-use).
64. Wright, supra note 33, at 348.
65. See generally Brandt, supra note 33; Harris, supra note 33.
66. DEP'T OF WATER RES. & U.S. BuREAU OF RECLAMATION, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
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Put in other terms, "the EWA is based on the concept that flexible management of
water will achieve fishery and ecosystem benefits more efficiently and to a greater
degree than a completely prescriptive regulatory approach." 67 Therefore, if successful,
the EWA could fundamentally change the nature of the relationship between regulatory
agencies and water users (or project operators), from that of adversaries to colleagues.
The EWA operates by acknowledging that there is an existing regulatory
baseline referred to as "Tier 1" that is composed of a variety of actions that
regulatory agencies have adopted over the past fifteen years to protect fish and
wildlife resources in the Delta.68 That regulatory baseline includes such standards
as the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan and Water Right Decision No. 1641; the
1993 Biological Opinion for winter-run chinook salmon; the 1995 Biological
Opinion for delta smelt; full use of the 800,000 acre-feet of CVP yield dedicated
to fish and wildlife purposes by section 3406(b)(2) of the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act; reductions in Delta pumping during critical periods; closure of
the Delta Cross Channel gates; and other similar measures.
69
Tier 2 measures involve the additional purchase or acquisition of between
185,000 and 600,000 acre-feet per year in water from sellers in the Sacramento
and San Joaquin valleys or from the "functional equivalent" of additional
purchases through the re-operation of CVP or SWP facilities.7 ° Such sales in
areas upstream of the Delta could come from reservoir releases, the substitution
of groundwater supplies for surface water supplies, or crop shifting or idling.71
Purchases in areas south of the Delta could come from the acquisition of
groundwater already in storage in the Arvin-Edison or Semitropic water banks,
from the borrowing of project water (i.e., shifting the timing of the delivery of
water not needed during the current year without interfering with current year
deliveries), or source shifting (i.e., shifting the timing of water needed during the
current year for compensation).72 Once acquired, EWA water is used to
compensate CVP and SWP water users for reduced exports, increased instream
flows, increased Delta outflows, or closure of the Delta Cross Channel, all of
which-in the absence of the EWA-would result in fewer water deliveries.73
The EWA is not without its flaws. The major potential flaw in the EWA is
that decisions appear to be made by groups of individuals identified either with
regulatory agencies or with the CVP/SWP or their contractors. Making decisions
in such a closed group-as was done last summer in connection with the so-
called "Napa Proposition"-is a very different effort than the type of
STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL WATER AccouNT, app. E at 3
(2003).
67. Id. at 1-3.
68. See id. at 2-3, 2-18 to 2-27.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2-3, 2-27 to 2-29.
71. Id. at 2-34 to 2-49.
72. Id. at 2-53 to 2-58.
73. Id. at 2-29 to 2-34.
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collaboration that led to settlements on both the San Joaquin and Sacramento
River systems during the Bay-Delta hearings. Those settlements were forged
initially by discussions between water users who developed a common frame of
reference and common goals. Appropriate regulatory agencies and project
operators were then included in order to ensure that the interests of all
stakeholders were reflected in those agreements. In the case of EWA, there is the
distinct possibility that decisions will be made in a way that reflects the interests
of the CVP and the SWP (or their respective contractors) at the expense of other
stakeholders in the system. If that turns out to be the case, that failure will tarnish
the opportunity presented in the EWA to move beyond treating water allocations
as a zero-sum game.
If the EWA proves to be a success by: (i) providing additional water for the
environment at no uncompensated cost to CVP and SWP contractors, and (ii)
providing incentives for resources agencies to prioritize the needs of instream
beneficial uses rather than simply attempting to obtain as much water as possible,
it will constitute a fundamental change from the legal landscape envisioned by
the Commission. The Final Report recognized-even before the appellate
decisions in Fullerton and California Trout-that the direct appropriation of
water for instream beneficial purposes would not comply with settled California
law. The EWA and, more generally, Water Code section 1707 have the potential
to achieve the goal of appropriating water for instream purposes indirectly, by
means of transfers, so as to avoid the difficulties associated with other forms of
protection for instream beneficial uses. The next part of this Article illustrates
those difficulties.
C. Alternative Doctrinal Theories for Improved Instream Flows
As described above, the Final Report identified several alternative legal
doctrines that could be used to provide additional protection for instream
beneficial uses: the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine of Article X, Section 2
of the California Constitution, the public trust doctrine, and CEQA.74 Although
the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine and the public trust doctrine have been
seen as having great promise, review of the past quarter-century suggests that
those doctrines have not provided the level of protection for instream beneficial
uses that their proponents suggested. By contrast, CEQA has emerged as a strong
tool mandating environmental protection, including protection for instream
beneficial uses.
74. See supra Part I.
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1. Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution
The Final Report pointed out that one alternate legal theory to provide
protection for instream beneficial uses would be the reasonable and beneficial
use doctrine of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution.75 The Final
Report did little more than identify the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine as
an option to protect instream beneficial uses and identify two different issues-
whether reducing flows below a certain level would constitute an unreasonable
use of water and whether a diverter could be forced to use an alternate method of
diversion.76 Similarly, the Staff Report identified the issues associated with the
use of Article X, Section 2 to protect instream beneficial uses, and discussed
several then-pending cases, but otherwise did little to explain the manner in
which the doctrine might be developed to protect instream beneficial uses of
water.77
Despite the relative silence of the Commission in 1978, the judiciary was in the
midst of a lengthy effort to use Article X, Section 2 to protect instream beneficial
uses. That effort began with the California Supreme Court's decision in Joslin v.
Marin Municipal Water District,78 which involved the use of water to replenish
gravels that were sold for commercial purposes. 79 The supreme court found that use
of water to be unreasonable and found that the inquiry as to reasonableness "cannot
be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent
importance. Paramount among these we see the ever increasing need for conservation
of water in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart from its express
recognition in the 1928 amendment." 80 Shortly before the release of the Final Report,
the court of appeal, in People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. Forni,
found the use of water for frost protection to be unreasonable. 8' In reaching its
conclusion, the court relied on Joslin for the proposition that "what is reasonable use
or reasonable method of use of water is a question of fact to be determined according
to the circumstances in each particular case."
82
Joslin and Forni established that the question of whether a use of water is or
is not reasonable presented policy questions of the first order that needed to be
addressed on a case-by-case basis. That conclusion was summarized in
Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District,83 where the
supreme court encapsulated the importance of the reasonableness inquiry and its
75. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 109.
76. Id. at 109-10.
77. STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 77-84.
78. 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
79. Id. at 891.
80. Id. at 894.
81. 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855-56 (Ct. App. 1976).
82. Id. at 855 (citation omitted).
83. 572 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 1977).
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fact-specific nature by stating that the "scope and technical complexity of issues
concerning water resource management are unequalled by virtually any other
type of activity presented to courts. What constitutes reasonable water use is
dependent upon not only the entire circumstances presented but varies as the
current situation changes." 84 With such a broad, yet virtually legislative, set of
issues,85 the stage was set for the use of the reasonable and beneficial use
doctrine to protect instream beneficial uses.
United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,6 discussed above,
addressed the use of Article X, Section 2 to protect instream beneficial uses of water.
In considering SWRCB Water Right Decision No. 1485, which established
requirements for the CVP and SWP diversions from the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Bay-Delta Estuary, the court upheld the SWRCB's authority to order reductions in
water diversions.87 The court stated that the SWRCB "had the authority to modify
the projects' permits to curtail their use of water on the ground that the projects' use
and diversion of water had become unreasonable."
88
The court further stated:
[The] Board's power to prevent unreasonable methods of use should be
broadly interpreted to enable the Board to strike the proper balance
between interests in water quality [in part to maintain instream beneficial
uses of water] and project activities in order to objectively determine
whether a reasonable method of use is manifested.89
However, despite the strong language in United States v. State Water Resources
Control Board, it is still unclear whether Article X, Section 2 will provide an avenue
for the protection of instream beneficial uses. From a practical standpoint, there are a
number of issues associated with identifying unreasonable uses of water and bringing
an enforcement action. As one commentator writes:
[T]he Board and the Department do not routinely police water use. When
they do, the threshold for remedial action by the Board or the courts remains
very high because the administrative costs are daunting. Finally, where the
Board actually takes action, any water saved through curtailment of waste
ultimately falls prey to appropriation by other users. 90
84. Id. at 1137.
85. See id. (stating that "[tihe question whether available economic resources should be devoted to waste
water reclamation or development of other water supplies is basically a legislative one.").
86. 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
87. Id. at 202.
88. Id. at 187.
89. Id. at 188. To similar effect, in the context of agricultural diversions of water, is Imperial Irrigation
Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 265 -66 (Ct. App. 1990).
90. Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for
Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 31-32 (1996).
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The preceding discussion in Part III.A of the manner in which the SWRCB
addressed conflicts in the Bay-Delta Estuary-the subject of United States v.
State Water Resources Control Board-confirms these conclusions. As noted
above, the SWRCB began hearings on implementing United States v. State Water
Resources Control Board in 1987 and did not complete the process until 2003
when the Phase 8 hearing was finally dismissed.9' Also, the reasonable and
beneficial use doctrine lurked in the background of the process due to its
discussion by the court in United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,
but the SWRCB focused on the development of appropriate water quality control
plan standards while the focus of water users was on developing workable
physical solutions. The SWRCB considered instream flows only insofar as they
were part of the water quality control plan. Thus, despite the broad language of
some courts that created (and maintain) an avenue to use Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution as a tool to provide water for instream beneficial uses,
it appears that this legal theory is, at least, past its prime.
2. The Public Trust Doctrine
The Commission viewed the public trust doctrine as another potentially
fruitful legal doctrine that could be used to provide instream beneficial uses with
adequate supplies of water, writing that the "expanding public trust doctrine also
has great potential for change. 92 Although the Commission did not consider the
public trust doctrine in detail, the Staff Report begins with an extensive
discussion of the public trust doctrine and its potential use to preserve instream
flows. 9 3 The Staff Report declares that the public trust doctrine "holds that the
State is the guardian or trustee of certain natural resources, in which private
rights may exist, for the protection of public rights of use." 94 Relying on the
California Supreme Court's decision in Marks v. Whitney,95 the Staff Report
notes that the public trust doctrine could be "viewed as requiring... tidelands to
remain in their natural state for ecological study, open space, aesthetic
purposes."96 Thus, the public trust doctrine could impact water rights just as it did
other private rights."97 Even though the assertion of the public trust doctrine has
not yet impaired consumptive water rights, nothing in theory prevents it.
Water use by private right holders which depletes the flow of a stream or
decreases the quality of the water so as to make it unsuitable for fish life,
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 110.
93. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 6-29.
94. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
95. 491 P.2d 374, 379-80 (Cal. 1971).
96. STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 23 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 25.
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navigation, recreation, or scenic and ecological uses, is as inconsistent
with public trust protection as fencing a stream off from the public,
filling tidelands, or depositing debris in a river.
98
The Staff Report concludes by recognizing that courts have not yet
confronted the effects on water rights as they relate to the public trust in fish and
navigable waters.99 Given the opportunity, the courts should clarify this issue.
As the Commission suggested, the conflict between the demands of the
public trust doctrine and consumptive water rights would come to the fore
shortly. As two commentators described the situation:
The administrative and legislative failure of a minimum streamflow
program and the judicial rejection of instream appropriations produced,
in the early 1980s, a political stalemate in California with regard to the
protection of uses of water. Instream flow advocates responded to this
stalemate by suing to expand judicial and administrative authority to
protect instream values.'°°
The suit came quickly. In 1979, the National Audubon Society and other
environmental groups filed suit against the Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power ("LADWP") challenging diversions from four streams that provided
water to Mono Lake. °10 In a landmark 1983 decision, National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court,0 2 the California Supreme Court considered the competing
claims of the prior appropriation doctrine and the public trust doctrine.
National Audubon provided the opportunity anticipated in the Staff Report
for the California courts to finally address the relationship between the public
trust doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine. The parties requested the
California Supreme Court to determine which doctrine-public trust or prior
appropriation-would supercede the other. As the supreme court described the
conflict, "[p]laintiffs, for example, argue[] that the public trust is antecedent to
and thus limits all appropriative water rights."'10 3 By contrast, LADWP argued
"that the public trust doctrine as to stream waters has been 'subsumed' into the
appropriative water rights system and, absorbed by that body of law, quietly
disappeared."' 04
98. Id. at 27 (footnotes omitted).
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Paul R. Williams & Stephen . McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The Next Step in
Protecting California's Instream Values, 9 STAN. ENvTL. L. 132, 150-51 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
101. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1983).
102. Id. at 712.
103. Id. at 727.
104. Id.
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The supreme court, in a carefully worded opinion, declined the parties'
invitations to find that either doctrine superceded the other.10 5 Instead, the supreme
court established a series of principles that would accommodate the needs of both
doctrines in the way that the court implicitly hoped the needs of both public trust
resources and consumptive uses of water would be met through its decision. 0 6 First,
the court stated that "[t]he state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control
over its navigable waters and the lands beneath those waters. This principle ...
prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner
harmful to the interests protected by the public trust."'1 7 In this way, the court
rejected any claim that the acquisition of a right to divert water would somehow
evade the demands of the public trust doctrine. Second, the court found that:
As a matter of current and historical necessity, the Legislature, acting
directly or through an authorized agency such as the Water Board, has
the power to grant usufructuary licenses that will permit an appropriator
to take water from flowing streams and use that water in a distant part of
the state, even though this taking does not promote, and may unavoidably
harm, the trust uses at the source stream.
108
The court continued, stating:
Now that the economy and population centers of this state have
developed in reliance upon appropriated water, it would be disingenuous
to hold that such appropriations are and have always been improper to
the extent that they harm public trust uses, and can be justified only upon
theories of reliance or estoppel.109
In this way, the court recognized that the needs of public trust resources may,
in appropriate circumstances, have to give way to broader social needs. Third, the
court articulated its desire for an accommodation between the needs of public
trust resources and consumptive uses of water by stating that:
The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in
the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust
uses whenever feasible. Just as the history of this state shows that
appropriation may be necessary for efficient use of water despite
unavoidable harm to public trust values, it demonstrates that an
appropriative water rights system administered without consideration of
105. Id.
106. See generally David R.E. Aladjem, Is Water Ripe for the Taking? The SWRCB's Lower Yuba River
Decision and the Public Trust Doctrine, 11 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 261, 262-63 (July 2001).
107. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 727.
108. Id.
109. Id. at728.
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the public trust may cause unnecessary and unjustified harm to trust
interests. 10
Hence, the court found that the SWRCB had jurisdiction and should
reconsider the impacts of the diversion of water by LADWP on public trust
interests even if that meant some modification of LADWP's prior rights."'
The California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon created the
opportunity to challenge existing diversions that were thought to have adverse
impacts on public trust resources. In United States v. State Water Resources
Control Board,"l2 the court considered public trust claims in the context of a
variety of challenges to Water Right Decision No. 1485, which regulated
diversions by the State of California and the United States from the Sacramento-
San Joaquin Bay-Delta Estuary." 3 The court found that National Audubon
established that the SWRCB "has continuing jurisdiction over appropriation permits
and is free to reexamine a previous allocation decision." ' 14 As part of the litigation,
there was the suggestion that the SWRCB had authority to require the United States
and/or the State of California to "consider alternative water supply measures (e.g.,
groundwater management, water conservation, wastewater reclamation) to reduce
exports from the Delta."'" 5 In dictum, the court suggested, by reference to the
National Audubon decision, that such measures would be within the scope of the
SWRCB's jurisdiction under the public trust doctrine if such measures were
needed to protect fish and wildlife resources. 1 6 In this way, the case potentially
laid the basis for requiring a diverter not only to modify the manner in which
water would be diverted, but also to change the source of water so as to reduce
impacts on public trust resources.
Similarly, in California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control
Board,' 7 plaintiffs sought to rescind LADWP's water right licenses from the
four streams at issue in National Audubon." 8 Although much of the opinion
involved an interpretation of two statutory provisions of the Fish and Game
Code, the court concluded with a discussion of the public trust doctrine. After a
brief review of the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the statute
at issue, the court noted that "a variety of public trust interests pertain to non-
navigable streams which sustain a fishery."" 9 For that reason, the court found
that public trust interests were protected from loss as a result of encroachments
110. Id. (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 728-29.
112. 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
113. See id. at 165-66.
114. Id. at 201.
115. Id. at 202.
116. Id.
117. 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1989).
118. Id. at 186.
119. Id. at 211.
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(like water diversions) by the operation of the statute of limitations. 120 Moreover,
given the broad grant of a "legislative mandate" to the SWRCB in National
Audubon to enforce the public trust, the court found a judicial remedy to require
the SWRCB to carry out that mandate.12 1 As the court put the matter, "[t]he
unfortunate fact that the Water Board did not hear the Legislature's voice in 1974
does not warrant, by the passage of time, its turning a deaf ear now."
1 22
Taken together, United States v. State Water Resources Control Board and
California Trout articulate a strong interpretation of National Audubon. Under
these decisions, the SWRCB has continuing jurisdiction to revisit water right
allocations whenever there may be detrimental impacts on public trust resources.
The SWRCB further has authority, in the appropriate circumstance, to force a
water user with a heretofore "vested" right to rely on some other source of water
if such a change is feasible in order to protect trust resources. Finally, because of
the broad "legislative mandate" in favor of the protection of such resources, there
are judicial remedies to compel the SWRCB to take actions needed to protect fish
and wildlife resources. 123 Those threads all came together in two decisions by the
SWRCB: Water Right Decision No. 1631 ("D-1631"), which related to LADWP's
permits to divert water from the four streams feeding Mono Lake, and Water
Right Decision No. 1644 ("D-1644"), which related to Yuba County Water
Agency's diversions of water from the Lower Yuba River.
In D- 1631, the SWRCB found that "there is strong evidence that replacement
water will be available to Los Angeles from a variety of sources."'124 Addressing
the potential need on the part of LADWP to change its sources of water, the
SWRCB noted that "if LADWP vigorously pursues the water reclamation
projects that it presently is developing, then reclaimed water will provide a
substantial augmentation to Los Angeles' supplies within the next decade.' 25
The SWRCB therefore concluded "that neither the water supply costs nor the
power supply costs.., make it infeasible to protect public trust resources in the
Mono Basin in accordance with the terms of this decision."'126 Similarly, in D-
1644, the SWRCB found that, because Yuba County Water Agency relied on the
use of earlier projects downstream of the Agency's diversions that had
deleterious impacts on public trust resources to deliver water, it was appropriate
to consider the impacts of those earlier projects in considering the impacts of the
Agency's projects on public trust resources. 27 The SWRCB reached this
120. Id.
121. Id. at 211,213.
122. Id. at 213.
123. As a subsequent decision in the California Trout litigation put the matter, "[t]he Water Board is not
legally inflicted with 'terminal regulatory anemia."' Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 800
(Ct. App. 1990).
124. S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1631, at 105 (Sept. 28, 1994).
125. Id. at 176.
126. Id. at 177.
127. S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1644, at 31-32(2001).
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conclusion even though the evidence in the record at the time showed that
"overall fish populations have stabilized or slightly increased following YCWA's
construction of New Bullards Bar Dam."'' 2 8 In reaching this conclusion, the
SWRCB articulated a "benefits" test for application of the public trust doctrine
that would enable the SWRCB to apply the doctrine even in the absence of harm
to public trust resources. 1
29
D-1631 and D-1644 may, however, have marked the high-water mark of the
public trust doctrine. There are a number of limitations to the doctrine. First, and
most notable, the public trust doctrine does not apply to artificial bodies of water
or nonnavigable streams that do not affect navigable waters. 3 ° This limitation
stems from the historical roots of the public trust doctrine as being based on the
use of streams and other water bodies for navigation.' Since many (if not most)
water facilities in California have some artificial element (either physical or
temporal), it is unclear how far the doctrine could extend outside of a situation
like that found in the Mono Basin. Second, as noted by several commentators, the
test articulated in National Audubon is based on a balancing of the public's
interest in public trust resources against its interest in the consumptive uses of
water. 132 Thus, all decisions allocating water to public trust resources are subject
to reappraisal in the future if conditions change. For instance, if LADWP is
unable to obtain the water needed to support population growth over the next
fifty years, it seems clear that the SWCRB would have jurisdiction to entertain
the claim that the public interest in such consumptive uses of water might require
a re-evaluation of the balance struck in D- 1631. Third, the public trust doctrine
does not guarantee protection for instream values to the extent that it may be
sought by an environmental group or by the California Department of Fish and
Game. 33 Thus, one noted commentator concludes, "barring further legal
developments, the utility of the public trust doctrine for restoring impaired aquatic
ecosystems can be undermined by the discretion inherent in its application."'
' 34
128. Id. at 32.
129. See Aladjem, supra note 106, at 263.
130. See Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841-42 (Ct.
App. 1989).
131. Id.
132. E.g., Thomas, supra note 90, at 38; Williams & McHugh, supra note 100, at 154; see Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (stating that "it would be disingenuous to hold
that such appropriations are and have always been improper to the extent that they harm public trust uses, and
can be justified only upon theories of reliance or estoppel.").
133. E.g., S.W.R.C.B. Order No. WR 95-04, at 19-20 (Feb. 16, 1995) (finding that even though
California Trout had recommended a minimum flow in Bear Creek of 2 cfs and the Department of Fish &
Game had recommended a minimum flow of 1.2 cfs, the SWRCB found that the public trust interests in Big
Bear Lake and Bear Creek were balanced by a flow of 0.3 cfs).
134. Thomas, supra note 90, at 40.
326
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3. CEQA
In retrospect, one of the more interesting comments in the Summary Report was
the statement that "[e]xisting measures compel consideration of instream values in
the decision-making process of various public agencies, but they do not compel
substantive protection itself."' 35 The Final Report mentioned the California
Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), but only to the extent of recognizing that the
Legislature had recently added Public Resources Code section 21002, which
demanded that public agencies "not approve projects... if there are feasible
alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which would substantially
lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects.
136
Despite the dismissive language in the Summary Report, the requirement that a
public agency consider the effects of its actions on the environment, and take feasible
actions to minimize or avoid those impacts, has had a tremendous impact on the
protection of instream flows. In the author's experience, public agencies pursuing
water projects that may have an adverse impact on instream flows expend
tremendous energy to address the potential impacts and to lessen any impacts to a
less-than-significant level. Those efforts are often hidden from public view in that
they occur either during the process of formulating a water project or during the
period during which the agency prepares a draft environmental impact report.
Nonetheless, these impacts are quite real and public agencies devote much time,
effort, and other public resources to ensuring that the needs of instream beneficial
uses are met in a reasonable manner.
A recently reported case illustrates the way in which the protection of instream
beneficial uses falls within the more general environmental protection program
implemented through CEQA. In Friends of the Eel River v. Sonoma County Water
Agency,137 the court considered a challenge to a change in diversions by Sonoma
County Water Agency that would have increased its diversions from the Russian River
from 55,000 acre-feet per year to 101,000 acre-feet per year.138 The agency prepared an
environmental impact report on the proposed change in operations but failed to "alert
the public and the decision makers to the cumulative impact of Eel River curtailments
pending before FERC [the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] and increased
Russian River diversions proposed in the Project."' 139 The court found that the failure to
disclose the cumulative impacts of the proposed project with the potential curtailment
of flows from the Eel River violated CEQA, stating:
The EIR concludes that existing supplies can meet future demands for water,
and that minimum stream flow requirements imposed by the State Water
135. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
136. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 105.
137. 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322 (Ct. App. 2003).
138. Id. at 328-30.
139. Id. at 332.
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Resources Control Board can also be maintained even when future water
demands are taken into account. This is not an insignificant conclusion
environmentally, because these minimum stream flow requirements are
designed in part to ensure the health of species in the river. And yet, had the
Agency taken into account the potential curtailment of Eel River diversions,
it might well have reached a different conclusion about whether existing
water supplies could satisfy customer demands and minimum stream flow
requirements.14
0
Thus, because CEQA requires a public agency to consider the potential impacts
of its actions on the environment, and then to implement feasible measures to
minimize or avoid those impacts, CEQA has emerged as a primary institutional
process for protecting instream beneficial uses during the past quarter-century. As
one court noted, the purpose of preparing an environmental impact report is "to
demonstrate to an apprehensive citizenry that the agency has, in fact, analyzed and
consider the ecological implications of its action."
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IV. THE FUTURE OF INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION
Stepping back from the details of the controversies surrounding the protection of
instream beneficial uses over the past quarter-century, one is left with the question of
whether or not the Commission's recommendations helped to advance water
management in California. The discussion of a number of controversies in Part IM of
this Article suggests that the Commission was correct to recommend that the
SWRCB set basic water quality objectives; without those objectives, it is unlikely
that there could have been a relatively amicable resolution (at least for the time
being) of the disputes regarding the diversion of water from the Bay-Delta Estuary.
Put otherwise, sound water management in California requires a regulatory
framework in which to operate.
The Commission was also wrong. For example, it expanded its recommendation
for centralized standards into the suggestion that the judiciary consider the use of
new doctrines to provide protection for instream beneficial uses. Although courts
have found that both the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine and the public trust
doctrine permit the reallocation of water from one use to another, the power of those
doctrines to provide water for instream beneficial uses is the subject of significant
questions. As pointed out above, the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine has been
read narrowly in California 14 2 and the public trust doctrine has also been limited in its
application-notwithstanding National Audubon and D- 1631.143
140. Id. at 333 (emphasis in the original).
141. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15003(d) (2004) (citing People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Bosio,
47 Cal. App. 3d 495 (1975)).
142. See discussion supra Part IflC. 1.
143. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
Most importantly, the Commission's focus on the SWRCB and the courts as
vehicles to protect instream beneficial uses failed to anticipate the most important
development of the past quarter-century: aligning the interests of water users and
regulatory agencies can cut the Gordian knots preventing sound water
management in California. Aligning the interests of water users with regulatory
agencies involves the recognition by water users that it is in their own self-
interest to take actions to ensure the protection of instream beneficial uses. Only
by ensuring the protection of instream beneficial uses may water users guarantee
that they can make beneficial use of their own water rights. The success of the
Bay-Delta water right hearing was that it allowed water users to reach this
recognition and then gave water users sufficient latitude to structure physical
solutions that protect fish and wildlife resources and allow for the consumptive
use of water. Conversely, aligning the interests of regulatory agencies with water
users involves the recognition on the part of regulatory agencies that it is in their
own interest to provide certainty to water users so as to obtain additional water or
other resources for use in enhancing instream beneficial uses. It is this
recognition that has given the EWA the potential to restructure the relationships
between key stakeholders in the Delta in a fundamental way.
Thus, through the Bay-Delta settlements and the EWA, the stage is set for
water users and regulatory agencies to move beyond the canned positions of the
past and attempt to collaborate to meet both sets of interests. It will be interesting
to see whether California can truly move beyond confrontation to collaboration
in the next quarter century. If so, the lesson of the last quarter century is that such
collaboration will occur through innovation within a regulatory framework.
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